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NEPA AFTER NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE 
COUNCIL V. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 
I. Introduction 
On September 17, 2002, the latest skirmish in an ongoing battle over the 
extra-territorial apphcation of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) was 
fought in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, pitting the 
Natural Resources Defense Council and other environmental groups against the 
United States Navy.^ On a day that found both environmentalists and the Department 
of Justice claiming victory, Judge Christina A. Snyder held that the U.S. Navy's 
Littoral Warfare Advanced Development (LWAD) Program as a whole was not 
subject to NEPA, but that individual sea tests under the program are.^ More 
important, however, was her holding that NEPA appUes to federal actions that may 
affect the environment within the 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). 
In this paper I will examine Judge Snyder's holding in hght of the 
legislative intent behind NEPA, the executive interpretation expressed in Executive 
Order 12,114,^ and case law regarding the extra-territorial application of NEPA. 
Additionally, I will discuss the precedential weight that NRDC v. United States 
Department of the Navy should be given in future cases and whether the uncertainty 
surrounding the extraterritorial apphcation of NEPA is now any clearer. Finally, I 
' Natural Resources Defense Council v. United States Department of the Navy, No CV-01-07781 Slip 
op. At 21 (CD. Cal. Sept. 19, 2002) 
^ Gary Polakovic, Environmental Review of Navy's Sonar Testing Upheld, Los Angeles Times, 
September 20, 2002, at Al. 
^ Exec. Order No. 12,114, 3 C.F.R. 356 (1980) reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1988). 
will conclude with recommendations designed to bring clarity and uniformity to the 
appUcation of NEPA worldwide. 
II. Background 
Natural Resources Defense Council v. United States Department of the Navy 
is one of a several recent cases relating to the use of active sonar, for both scientific 
and mihtary purposes, and its potentially damaging impact on marine mammals. 
Conceived in 1996, the LWAD program was designed to address the changing 
submarine threat conditions following the collapse of the Soviet Union. A new threat 
is perceived to come from smaller diesel electric submarines which have become 
increasingly quieter and more accessible to potentially hostile nations bordering the 
Uttorals (the shelf area around most land masses extending from a few miles to 
several hundred miles off shore). These littoral areas present more of a challenge to 
anti-submarine warfare than the deep ocean due to variable oceanographic conditions 
(such as dramatic current and temperature changes) and increased marine traffic 
emitting sounds which interfere with and otherwise complicate submarine detection. 
The LWAD Program is the primary vehicle for coordination of testing and 
demonstration of Littoral Anti-Submarine Warfare (LASW) technologies.'* The sea 
tests (2-3 per year) generally involve the use of both active and passive sonar. Active 
sonar involves the generation of sound from an underwater transmitter and then 
detecting and processing the return signal, while passive sonar involves simply 
listening for sounds. Many tests have already been conducted in locations throughout 
the world, including the Gulf of Mexico, Long and Onslow Bays, near the Hudson 
Canyon, off-shore from Southern California and Oregon, the Adriatic Sea, the East 
China Sea, and the western Pacific.^ While traditional passive sonar proved very 
effective during the Cold War at detecting relatively noisy submarines in the deep 
ocean, it has proven ineffective in noisy, crowded littoral areas, particularly in recent 
years due to advancement in sound quieting techniques.^ The U.S. Navy has 
determined that the use of low frequency active sonar best meets the current need for 
reliable detection of quieter, harder to find submarines, hi reaching this conclusion, 
the Navy considered the potential environmental impacts and determined that 
geographic restrictions and monitoring mitigation will ensure marine mammals are 
not exposed to active sonar greater than 185 dB and therefore the impact on marine 
mammals will be neghgible. 
Environmental groups, however, have taken issue with these conclusions. 
They claim that the Navy's plan to deploy its powerftil active sonar system will have 
catastrophic effects on marine mammals. Potential impacts include death from lung 
hemorrhage, tissue frauma, hearing loss or impairment, psychological and 
physiological stress (making marine mammals more vulnerable to disease, parasites 
and predators) and disruption of traditional migration, breeding and feedmg patterns. 
As evidence, they cite the sfranding of whales and dolphins, many with hemorrhaging 
apparent around their eyes and ears, on beaches in the Bahamas in 2000 after a U.S. 
" LWAD mission description, available atlittp://www.onr.navy.mil/oas/projects/lwad/users_guide.htm. 
' Certification of Administrative Record at 4, Scott Martin Tilden, CDR, USN, Natural Resources 
Defense Council v. United States Department of the Navy, (No CV-01-07781). 
^Id. 2X3. 
' Record of Decision for Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System Low Frequency Active Sonar, 
Department of the Navy/Department of Defense, 3801-FF, July 16, 2002. 
* The SURTASS LFA Threat, available at http://www.earthrealitv.net/'Stop LFAS.htm and Low 
Frequency Active Sonar available at http://www.acousticecolopv.org/srlfas.html 
Navy battle group used active sonar in the immediate area.^ They also attribute a 
mass stranding of beaked whales off the west coast of Greece in 1996 to an active 
sonar system being tested by NATO at the time/° Environmental groups allege that 
the Navy was made aware of the potential harmful effects of active sonar when, 
during one of their initial tests off the east coast of the island of Hawaii, a snorkeler 
was injured and Humpback whales were driven from the test area shortly after testing 
began.'' 
III. NRDC V United States Department of the Navy 
Claiming a flagrant lack of compliance with environmental statutes by the 
Navy in conducting LWAD sea tests, the Natural Resources Defense Council 
(NRDC) filed suit seeking to require the Navy to carry out environmental studies as 
required by NEPA prior to conducting fiirther sea tests. NRDC claimed that, under 
NEPA, not only is each individual sea test an agency action subject to environmental 
review, but the LWAD Program as a whole should be evaluated in a program wide 
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). This case is ripe with environmental law 
issues, with NRDC also alleging the Navy had violated the Endangered Species Act, 
the Marine Mammal Protection Act and the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation 
and Management Act. 
In a motion for svimmary judgment, the Navy alleged that NRDC lacked 
standing to challenge the LWAD program. The Navy also claimed that the LWAD 
^ Spread of Active Sonar Threatens Whales at http://www.nrdc.org/wildUfe/marine/nlfa/asp 
''Id. 
" Supra note 7. 
Program is not a reviewable final agency action and that individual tests conducted 
beyond U.S. territory are not subject to environmental review under NEPA. 
When the smoke cleared, the court found that NRDC had standing as they had 
observed and enjoyed wildhfe in many of the areas where LWAD tests had been 
conducted. ^^  The court did not reach the merits of the claims under the Endangered 
Species Act, the Marine Mammal Protection Act, and the Marine Sanctuaries 
Protection Act because the individual sea test challenged, Sea Test 02-2, was 
ultimately canceled by the Navy.   The most significant holdings, however, were 
related to the NEPA claims, hi a victory for the defendant. Judge Snyder found that 
the LWAD Program is only engaged in general planning and does create activities 
with an impact on the environment. Therefore, the Navy's decision to conduct 
environmental assessments for each individual sea test, and not for the LWAD 
Program as a whole, was not arbitrary and capricious.'^ Finally, in a holding that may 
have impacts even beyond severely limiting the testing and ultimate deployment of a 
defensive active sonar system, the court found that NEPA applies to federal actions 
which may affect the environment within 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic 
Zone (EEZ).'"* In reaching her decision. Judge Snyder noted that the decision making 
process involved in preparing the sea tests occurred within the United States and that 
the United States has significant rights and "substantial, if not exclusive legislative 
control of the EEZ."'^ 




Natural Resources Defense Council v. the United States Department of the 
Navy is the first case to specifically address the applicability of NEPA to the EEZ. 
EstabUshed in 1983 by Presidential Proclamation, the EEZ "extends for a distance of 
200 nautical miles from the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is 
measured."'^ The EEZ is not part of United States Territory and all nations enjoy the 
high seas freedom of navigation, overflight and other internationally lawful uses of 
this area. The United States, however, enjoys exclusive rights regarding the 
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management of natural resources within its EEZ. 
IV. NEPA 
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 was enacted by Congress in 
response to growing national concern over the increased degradation the 
environment. The first statute to address environmental concerns within a 
comprehensive national policy, NEPA remains the cornerstone of American 
environmental protection. Congress recognized the need for man and nature to exist 
in "productive harmony" for the benefit of present and fixture generations of 
Americans.^^  Under NEPA, federal agencies proposing major action must consider 
the environmental impacts of such action. Procedural in nature, NEPA requires 
federal agencies to perform an environmental impact statement (EIS) for all major 
' Pres. Proc. No. 5030,48 Fed. Reg. 10605 (March 10, 1983). 
''Id. 
'* The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370c (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). 
federal actions that will have a significant impact on the environment.'^ hi particular, 
all agencies shall: 
Liclude in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and 
other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human 
environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on- 
(i)       the environment of the proposed action, 
(ii)      any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the 
proposal be implemented, 
(iii)     alternatives to the proposed action, 
(iv)      the relationship between local short term uses of man's environment 
and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and 
(v)       any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which 
would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented. 
The EIS process requires extensive reviews of proposed Federal action. This 
process is subject to public participation and judicial review. Litigation over an 
incomplete or inadequate EIS can delay or even stop a project all together. 
Additionally, damaging information uncovered during this assessment process may 
incite public outrage, or provide the basis for legal challenge under other 
environmental laws. 
" 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2)(C) (1988). 
The sweeping and general language of NEPA, however, has led to extensive 
litigation over the territorial application of the EIS requirement. The language of 
NEPA fails to clearly define the reach of the statute. It is not clear from the face of 
the broad language whether the term "environment" includes the environment outside 
of the territory of the United States. Section 101 of NEPA recognizes "the profound 
impact of man's activity on the interrelations of all components of the natural 
environment" and "the critical importance of restoring and maintaining 
environmental quality to the overall welfare and development of man."    Section 102 
(2)(F) requires all federal agencies to "recognize the worldwide and long-range 
character of environmental problems and, where consistent with the foreign policy of 
the United States, lend appropriate support to initiatives, resolutions, and programs 
designed to maximize international cooperation in anticipating and preventing a 
decline in the quality of mankind's world environment."^^ The broad, sweeping 
language of NEPA has led some to conclude that Congress fully intended to apply the 
statute worldwide. 
Others, however, find NEPA's language too vague and filled with generalities 
to be conclusive of Congressional intent.^"^ The extraterritorial application of NEPA 
must be expressed through a "plain statement of extraterritorial statutory effect," 
and the EIS requirement of NEPA contains no such language.^^ Other portions of 
^'M 4331(a). 
^^W. 4332(2)(F). 
^^ See David Young, The applications of Environmental Impact Statements to United States 
Participation in Multinational Development Projects, 8 Am. U.J. Int'l L. & Pol'y309, 316-17 (1992). 
^'* See George H. Keller, Note Greenpeace v. Stone: The Comprehensive Environmental Impact 
Statement and the Extraterritorial Reach of NEPA, 14 U. Haw. L. Rev. 751, 768-71 (1992); Comment, 
NEPA's Role in Protecting the World Environment, 131 U. Pa. L. Rev.353, 360-64 (1982). 
^' Astoria Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104,109 (1991). 
^ Supra note 19 § 4332(2)(C). 
NEPA assume that the focus of the EIS requirement is wholly domestic. The last 
sentence of Section 102(2)(C) requires federal agencies to seek the views of State and 
local agencies on EISs, but contains no requirement that they seek the views of 
foreign governments or international agencies.^^ hi addition, Section 102(2)(D) 
provides that EISs for actions under grants to states may be prepared by state agencies 
or officials, but makes no analogous provision for actions funded under grants to 
foreign governments or international bodies, as would be the case if the EIS 
requirement applied to such projects.^^ Furthermore, Section 102(2)(D) specifically 
requires that in the case of state agency-prepared impact statements, the views of 
other states and federal land management agencies must be sohcited for projects that 
may have significant impacts upon lands administered by them, but it contains no 
similar requirement that the views of foreign countries or international agencies be 
solicited, as would have been done if Section 102(2)(C) applied beyond United States 
29 temtory. 
When Congress wants to accompUsh a particular goal, it knows how to do so. 
The Supreme Court has specifically noted "when it desires to do so. Congress knows 
how to place the high seas within the jurisdictional reach of a statute.^^ For example, 
certain provisions of the Clean Water Act ^^ apply to discharges in the high seas.^^ 
Also, the Foreign Assistance Act requires assessments of impacts of development 
projects "upon the environment and natural resources of developing countries." 
''Id. 
'^ Id. § 4332(2)(D). 
^'W. §4332(2)(D)(iv). 
^^ Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp, 488 U.S. 428,440 (1989). 
^'33U.S.C. § 1251,etseq. 
'^ See Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1,11 (1981). 
"22U.S.C. §2151. 
Given the absence of clear language indicating Congressional intent, one must review 
the legislative history for indications that Congress intended to apply NEPA 
worldwide. 
V. Legislative Iiistory 
NEPA commentary is found in the Congressional White Paper on a National 
PoUcy for the Environment.^"* Recognizing the need for our national environmental 
poUcy to consider global impacts, the White Paper states that "the global character of 
ecological relationships must be the guide for domestic activities. Ecological 
considerations should be infused into all international relations."^^ The white paper 
concludes by suggesting a statement of poUcy outlining Congress' intent to consider 
the "worldwide context" of the environment. 
During Senate consideration of the Conference Report on NEPA , Senator 
Henry "Scoop" Jackson emphasized the "need to seek solutions to environmental 
problems on an international level because they are international in origin and scope. 
The earth is a common resource, and cooperative effort will be necessary to protect 
it."-'* hi reference to section 102 (2) (F) (discussed above) he noted that because 
"environmental problems are not confined by political boundaries, all agencies of the 
Federal Government which have international responsibilities are authorized and 
directed to lend support to appropriate international efforts to anticipate and prevent a 
^* Senate Comm. On Interior and Insular Affairs an House Comm. On Science and Astronautics, 90* 
Cong., 2d Sess., Congressional White paper on a National Policy for the Environment (July 17, 1968(, 
reprinted in 115 Cong. Rec. 29,078-82 (1969). 
^' Id. at 29,082. 
''Id 
" H.R. Rep. No.765, 91'' Cong.,f * Sess. 7-12 (1969) reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.CA.N. 2767. 
^* S. Rep. No. 91-296, 91" Cong., l" Sess. 21 reprinted in 115 Cong Rec 40,416 (1969). 
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decline in the quality of the worldwide environment."^^ hi the Conference 
Committee process, the Conferees added a requirement that federal agency support 
for international efforts could only be done "where consistent with the foreign policy 
of the United States,"'"' in response to concerns over intruding into the foreign policy 
arena. While this "cooperative mechanism" was intended to address concerns over 
the worldwide nature of environmental problems, the EIS requirement of Section 
102(2)(C) was never altered to include a "plain statement" applying NEPA's EIS 
requirement extraterritorially. While Congress heard testimony about the worldwide 
nature of environmental problems and expressed concern about these problems, it 
would appear it intended NEPA's EIS requirement to apply only domestically, and 
reserved consideration of extraterritorial matters for the sphere of international 
cooperation. 
However, note that in 1970, during oversight hearings on agency compliance 
with NEPA, the congressional subcommittee rejected the State Department's 
interpretation that NEPA's EIS requirement is limited to actions within the United 
States (this particular hearing dealt with foreign aid programs)."*^   In concluding that 
NEPA requires an environmental assessment of foreign, as well as domestic projects, 
the Committee stated "the history of the Act makes it quite clear that the global 
effects of environmental decisions are inevitably a part of the decision-making 
process and must be considered in that context.""*^ While there is ample evidence 
from the legislative history of NEPA to support arguments both for and against the 
''Id. 
"" See "Major Changes in S. 1075 as Passed by the Senate", H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 765, 9f' Cong., r' 
Sess. (Dec. 17, 1969) Exh. 10, reprinted at \\5 Cong. Rec. H. 40923 (Dec. 22, 1969)(Ex. 11). 
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extaterritorial application of NEPA, the legislative history does not provide 
conclusive evidence of congress's intent. 
VI. Executive Order 12,114 
In January of 1979, President Carter, in an effort to cover a perceived gap in 
NEPA's coverage, signed Executive Order 12,114. The goal of Executive Order 
12,114 is to "further the purpose of the National Environmental Policy 
Act.. .consistent with the foreign poHcy and national security policy of the United 
States.""*^ The Executive Order effectively strikes a balance between the interests of 
environmental assessment and the need to ensure the integrity of the Executive 
Branch authority over the conduct of foreign relations and national security matters. 
Without specifically limiting NEPA's extraterritorial reach, the Order set forth 
requirements for analysis of environmental impacts abroad firom federal actions. The 
Order requires agencies approving actions outside of the United States to prepare an 
analysis of the environmental impact (Overseas Environmental Assessment) and 
consider it in their decision making process.'*'*  While similar to NEPA in its 
approach, Executive Order 12114 falls far short of affording the same enviroimiental 
protections found in NEPA. The Order provides for numerous exemptions, including 
actions taken by the President or pursuant to directions of the President or a cabinet 
officer.'*^ Also, section 3-1 of the Order states that its requirements establish internal 
*' House Comm. On Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Administration of the National Environmental 
Policy Act, H.R. Rep. No. 92-316, 92"^ Cong., 1'' Sess. 1971. 
"^ Supra note 17. 
"" Id. § 2-3 at 356. 
"' Id. § 2-5 at 356. 
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procedures but do not provide for enforcement through a private cause of action.'"' 
Lacking enforcement capabilities, the Order has been generally ineffective, although 
in some cases courts have viewed compliance with the Order as a factor in 
determining whether to apply NEPA beyond United States territory.'*' Finally, 
Executive Order 12114 does little to clarify the reach of NEPA. The purpose and 
scope section of the Order acknowledges that it is based on authority independent of 
NEPA"*^ and section 2-4 states that the Order was not intended to invalidate any 
49 
existmg regulations. 
VII. Case Law 
The body of case law interpreting the extraterritorial reach is extensive. 
Courts have been presented with cases involving enviroiraiental impacts exclusively 
in foreign countries, environmental impacts in the global commons, and 
environmental impacts both in the United States and beyond the territory of the 
United States. Unfortunately, in the quarter century since NEPA's inception, the 
ambiguity regarding the extraterritorial application of NEPA has not been clearly 
resolved by the U.S. courts. We have yet to encounter a case that has given a 
definitive holding on NEPA's reach beyond U.S. borders. The specific facts of 
NEPA cases has generally lent to narrow holdings of limited guidance or precedence, 
or resulted in agency compliance or withdrawal of the proposed action prior to court 
resolution of the extraterritorial application issue. 
"^W. §3-lat356. 
"' See, e.g., Greenpeace USA v. Stone, 748 F. Supp. 749 (D. Haw. 1990). 
"* Supra note 17 § 1-1 at 356. 
'"M§ 2-4 at 356. 
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A. The presumption against the extraterritorial application of U.S. laws 
In 1909, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes established the now generally 
accepted rule against the extraterritorial application of U.S. laws. While decUning to 
apply the Sherman Act to a monopoly in Costa Rica (although both parties were U.S. 
corporations), he wrote "the general and almost universal rule is that the character of 
an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country 
where the act is done."^° Holmes concluded that a nation's legitimate regulatory 
jurisdiction extends only to the borders of its territory and, absent a clear mandate by 
Congress, a court must confine the operation and effect of a statute to those territorial 
limits.^' The Supreme Court discussed this standard again in Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 
and Equal Opportxmity Commission V. Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco).    In 
both cases the court recognized a need to avoid international conflicts of law and 
found that the presumption against the extraterritorial application of U.S. law is 
overcome only by proof of an affirmative congressional intent to apply a statute 
beyond U.S. territory.^'* 
In finding that NEPA appUes to federal action that may affect the environment 
in the EEZ, Judge Snyder did not disregard the presumption against the 
extraterritorial application of U.S. law.   The freedom of the seas has always been 
limited by customary international law permitting national jurisdiction over the 
'° American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909). 
^' Id. At 357. 
" Foley Bros v. Filard, 336 U.S. 281 (1949). 
'^ Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco), 449 U.S. 244 
(1991). 
'^ Id. at 248 and supra note 22 at 285-86 (reasoning that Congress is limited to legislating domestic 
matters and should not interfere with the sovereignty of another state). 
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marine zone, or territorial sea, just off the nation's coast. Initially this zone was three 
miles, or the traditional "cannon shot." Over the years, however, the boundaries have 
been pushed farther out to sea by coastal states, over heated protests from fishing 
nations. The United States contributed to the "creeping jurisdiction" of the territorial 
seas when it issued the Truman Proclamations in 1945, extending U.S. coastal 
jurisdiction and control to the natural resources, seabed and fisheries of its continental 
shelf"   The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)^^ signed 
in 1982 and came into force in 1994, established internationally recognized 
boundaries on the territorial sea (12 nautical miles) and the EEZ (200 nautical 
miles).^^ While the United States has not ratified UNCLOS, it has agreed to follow its 
CO 
provisions and in 1983 imilaterally declared a 200 nautical mile EEZ.    While 
UNCLOS grants extensive rights to a nation over its EEZ, with these rights come 
increased environmental responsibility. UNCLOS states that a coastal state may 
exercise authority to protect and preserve the marine environment in its EEZ and 
"shall" ensure the conservation and utiUzation of its hving marine resources.^^ In her 
holding in NRDC v. United States Department of the Navy, Judge Snyder recognized 
that the authority to manage and exploit resources in the EEZ goes hand in hand with 
the responsibility to safeguard the environment in the EEZ. She also noted the 
general absence of foreign pohcy concerns regarding actions and impacts within the 
EEZ due to the authority the United States exercises there. 
^' 10 Fed. Reg. 12304,12305, Sept. 28, 1945. 
'* U.N. Doc A/CONF.62/122, reprinted in 211.L.M.1261 (1982) 
"W. Articles 3 and 57. 
^^ Supra note 15. 
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B. NEPA Case Law 
The first case to review the appUcation of NEPA in an extraterritorial setting 
was Wilderness Society v. Morton.^° American environmental groups had filed suit 
seeking an injunction, claiming non-compUance with NEPA prior to issuance of a 
permit for the trans -Alaska pipeline.^^ A Canadian group, the Wilderness Society, 
sought to intervene and ensure that Canadian interests were represented.    The 
District Court denied the groups application to intervene, claiming that American 
groups adequately represented Canadian interests, and that protection of the 
American environment would by necessity protect the Canadian environment.    The 
Court of Appeals reversed and granted the Wilderness Society standing, holding that 
the "interests of the United States and Canadian environmental groups were 
sufficiently antagonistic" to require approval of the grant for intervention.^'' Li 
allowing foreign nationals standing in NEPA litigation, the court noted that the 
holding would not create "interference with the conduct of foreign relations."^^ This 
concern over the potential impact on U.S. foreign policy when applying NEPA 
extraterritorial would become a common theme in future cases. 
The issue of NEPA's application to federal actions in United States trust 
territories was addressed in Saipan ex rel. Guerrero v. United States ^^ and People of 
^' Supra note 27, Articles 56, 61 and 62. 
*° 463 F.2d 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (per curiam). 
*'Mat 1261. 
*^M. at 1261-62. 
"Mat 1262. 
*' Id. at 1263. 
** 356 F. Supp. 645 (D. Haw. 1973) aff d as modified, 502 F.2d 90 (9* Cir. 1974), cert. Denied, 420 
U.S. 1003 (1975). 
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Enewetak v. Laird.^^ In Guerrero, the plaintiffs sought an injunction preventing the 
construction of a hotel on public land in Saipan until NEPA was compUed with. 
The case was dismissed by the district court and the United States Court of Appeals 
affirmed the dismissal holding that, while NEPA applies in trust territory, action by 
the trust territory government is not federal action under NEPA.^^ In Enewetak, the 
United States District Court for the District of Hawaii found NEPA applicable to 
federal actions in the Pacific Island Territories. The plaintiffs, residents and poUtical 
leaders of the Enewetak atoll, sought to enjoin tests involving the detonation of 
powerfiil explosives to determine the vulnerability of U.S. defenses to nuclear 
attack.'"  In this case, the defendants, the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Air 
Force, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, Commander in Chief of the United States 
military forces in the pacific ocean area, and Director of the Defense Nuclear Agency, 
were clearly federal agencies. In examining the statutory language of NEPA, the 
court found the statute "silent on the extent of its coverage."'^ Next, the court looked 
to the legislative history, and noting the use of the term "nation" rather than "United 
States" in Section 102(2)(F) concluded that "Congress intended NEPA to apply in all 
areas under its exclusive control. In areas like the Trust Territory there is Uttle, if 
any, need for concern about the conflicts with United States foreign policy or the 
balance of world power."'^ In examining the Trusteeship Agreement, the court noted 
that the United States has "fiiU powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction" 
^' 353 F. Supp. 811(D. Haw. 1973). 
*' Saipan ex rel. Guerero v. United States Dept. of Interior, 502 F.2d 90, 93 (9* Cir. 1974), cert, denied 
420 U.S. 1003(1975). 
*'Mat96. 
^'^ Supra note 68 at SU. 
''Mat 815. 
'^M at 818. 
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over the territory/^ Based on the authority of the United States over this territory, the 
court found it "unnecessary to decide the question" of extraterritorial appHcation of 
NEPA, but instead included the Atoll of Enewetak within the "Nation" afforded 
protection under NEPA.''* 
1974 and 1975 saw environmental groups the Sierra Club and the 
Environmental Defense Club file suits against the Atomic Energy Commission and 
the United States Agency for International Development seeking to apply NEPA 
extraterritorially to the export of nuclear fuels and an international pest control 
program. No decision was reached on the merits, however, as the defendants in both 
cases conceded that NEPA apphed to their actions and prepared EISs in accordance 
withNEPA.'^ 
The issue of NEPA's extraterritorial application next appeared in the Sierra 
Club V. Adams,'^ where a decision enjoining the United States Department of 
Transportation's participation in the construction of the Darien Gap Highway fi-om 
Panama to Colombia (for noncompliance with NEPA) was appealed by federal 
officials.^' The district court had ordered the Government to file a complete EIS 
under NEPA.'^ On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District Court 
of Columbia Circuit found the EIS to be in compUance with NEPA."^^ While 
acknowledging that the project would have a negative impact on the native 
^^ Id. n. 12. 
'"Mat 817 n. 10. 
" See 4 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,685 (D.D.C. Aug. 3 1974) and 6 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,121 (D.D.C. Dec 5, 1975). 
'^ Sierra Club v. Adams, 578 F.2d 389 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
■"Mat 390. 
'* Sierra Club v. Coleman, 421 F. Supp. 63, 65 (D.D.C. 1976). The district court found the EIS 
deficient in the manner it addressed: (1) the potential transmission of foot and mouth disease, (2) the 
impact on indigenous people in the area, and (3) alternatives to the project. 
'' Supra note 77 at 393-396. 
18 
population, the court determined that the EIS analysis complied with the requirements 
of NEPA.^° In addressing the apphcabihty of NEPA to the project, the court merely 
"assumed" that NEPA applied to the construction in Panama and left the resolution of 
the question of the apphcabihty of NEPA outside of the United States "to another 
day."^^ 
National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) v. 
Department of State involved United States assistance to Mexican efforts to eradicate 
marijuana and poppy plants through herbicide (paraquat) spraying.^^ The government 
had agreed to prepare an EIS concerning the effects of the spraying program in the 
United States, but asserted that that a limited "environmental analysis" and not an EIS 
was required for the program's environmental impact in Mexico.    The plaintiff 
sought a declaratory judgment indicating that the Department of State was in 
violation of the EIS requirement of NEPA, and an injimction enjoining the United 
States from assisting with the spraying program until NEPA was complied with. 
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia, based on the programs 
effects within the United States, held that the participation by the United States 
amounted to "federal" action imder NEPA and was subject to the EIS requirement of 
NEPA.^^ Satisfied with the plans for an EIS related to the effects in the United States 
and an "environmental analysis" of the effects in Mexico, the court declined to issue 
an injunction and, like the court in Sierra Club v. Adams, left open the question of 
^° Mat 396. 
*' Id. at 392 n. 14 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
*^ 452 F. Supp. 1226 (D.D.C. 1978) 
*' Id. at 1232. 
*" Mat 1228. 
*' Id at 1232. 
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NEPA's extraterritorial applicability. ^^ Both Sierra Club v. Adams and NORML v. 
United States Department of State applied NEPA to federal actions with 
environmental impacts both within and outside of the United States, but failed to 
address the applicability of NEPA to projects with no domestic impacts. 
Unlike Sierra Club v. Adams and NORML v. United States Department of 
State, Natural Resources Defense Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission^^ offers 
a more definitive holding regarding the extraterritorial application of NEPA and the 
EIS requirement. The case involved efforts by the government of the Philippine 
Islands to acquire its first nuclear generator.^^ Westinghouse had filed an export 
hcensing appUcation to sell generator components to the National Power Corporation 
of the Philippines.^' In issuing the license, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
interpreted NEPA to apply to environmental impact feU within the United States and 
in the global commons, but not in the Philippine Islands.'^ The Natural Resources 
Defense Council sought review of the hcensing decision, noting the proposed site 
proximity to two U.S. mihtary bases, four active volcanoes and a known seismically 
active area'^ They asserted that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission had failed to 
meet its obligations under both the Atomic Energy Act'^ and NEPA (for failing to 
perform a site-specific EIS).'^ Prior to addressing the matter, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Distiict of Columbia acknowledged that while many courts had 
'^ Id. at 1235. 
^^ 647 F. 2d 1345 (D.C. Cir 1981) 




'^ Id at 1355. Petitioners alleged a violation of 103(d) of the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. 2133(d), 
which prohibits the issuance of a license where it would be "inimical to common defense and security 
or to the health and safety of the public." 
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been faced with the question of NEPA's appUcation abroad none had adequately 
addressed it.^'* In a narrowly drafted opinion, the court ruled that NEPA did not apply 
to the export of nuclear technology where the environmental impacts would occur 
exclusively in a foreign jurisdiction.^^ The court stated: 
"the NEPA jurisprudence indicates that exclusively foreign impacts do not 
automatically invoke the statute's environmental obligations. I find only that 
NEPA does not apply to NRC nuclear licensing decisions and not necessarily 
that the EIS requirement is inapphcable to some other kind of major federal 
action abroad."^^ 
Although limiting its holding to hcensing decisions by the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, the court recognized that U.S. laws may be enforced beyond U.S. 
borders when the U.S. "holds all the cards."^^ When applying U.S. law 
extraterritorially, however, the court recognized the potential conflict with foreign 
policy goals and recommended a balancing test, with the conduct of United States 
foreign relations carrying significant weight.^^ Finding that the "foreign policy" 
clause of section 102(2)(F) limited the extraterritorial application of NEPA's EIS 
requirement, the court stated that NEPA "looks toward cooperation, not unilateral 
action, in a manner consistent with [United States] foreign pohcy." 
''Id. 
'Ud. 




" Id at 1366. 102(2)(F) provides : 
All agencies of tiie Federal Government shall.. .recognize the worldwide and long-range 
character of environmental problems and, where consistent with the foreign policy of the 
United States, lend appropriate support to initiatives, resolutions, and programs designed to 
maximize international cooperation in anticipating and preventing a decline of mankind's 
world enviroimient. 
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The concern over foreign policy considerations in the appUcation of NEPA 
was raised again in Greenpeace U.S.A. v. Stone.^*'° In Greenpeace, the district court 
of Hawaii addressed the extraterritorial application of NEPA to U.S. Army's removal 
of obsolete chemical munitions stored in the Federal Republic of Germany, and their 
transportation to the Johnston Atoll, a U.S. territory, for destruction.^*^^   Rather than 
conducting a comprehensive EIS covering the entire operation, the Army prepared 
separate EISs for the construction and operation of the Johnston Atoll facility, the 
disposal of solid and liquid wastes that the facility would produce and the disposal of 
the munitions themselves.^°^ The Army also conducted an Environmental 
Assessment pursuant to Executive Order 12,114 analyzing the environmental impacts 
of the transoceanic shipment of the munitions from West Germany to the Johnston 
Atoll, but neglected to conduct an analysis covering the shipment of munitions within 
West Germany. ^°^ Greenpeace challenged the lack of a comprehensive EIS and 
sought to enjoin the shipment.'°'' In ruhng on the plaintiffs motion for a preliminary 
injunction, the court was particularly sensitive to the fact that movement of munitions 
resulted directly from an agreement between the President and a foreign head of 
state.'°^ Citing the NRDC v. NRC holding, the court found that NEPA did not apply 
to the movement of munitions within Germany due to the absence of an express 
congressional mandate to apply NEPA in a foreign country, and a reluctance to 
""' 748 F.Supp. 749 (D. Haw. 1990). 
'*" Id. at 752. Under agreements entered into by Presidents Reagan and Bush, the Department of the 
Army imdertook a joint plan with the West German Army to remove chemical weapons from their 
storage site in West Germany and transport them to the Johnston Atoll for disposal in the Johnston 
Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System. 
'"'Id. 
'""Mat 753-54. 
'"^ Mat 757-58. 
22 
interfere with the President's foreign affairs powers.^^^ The court felt that applying 
NEPA to the movement within West Germany would show a "lack of respect for the 
Federal Republic of Germany's sovereignty, authority and control over actions within 
its borders."^°^ ha considering the appUcation of NEPA to the transoceanic shipment 
of the munitions, the court acknowledged that although the Army was no longer 
acting within the borders of a foreign nation, or in concert with a foreign nation, the 
transoceanic shipment was a necessary consequence of the stockpile's removal from 
West Germany and many of the same foreign policy concerns were implicated. 
The court was also persuaded that, although Executive Order 12,114 did not preempt 
NEPA's extraterritorial appUcation, compUance with that order would be given 
weight in determining whether the shipment phase must be incorporated in the 
Johnston Atoll EIS.'°^ Swayed by foreign poUcy considerations, and the adequacy of 
the environmental assessment performed under Executive Order 12,114, the court 
concluded that NEPA had not been violated by the failure "to consider the 
transoceanic shipment of chemical munitions to Johnston Atoll in the same 
comprehensive EIS as the incineration of those munitions."''° Accordingly, the 
plaintiffs motion for injimctive rehef was denied."' 
Li Environmental Defense Fund v. Massey, the plaintiffs challenged the 
National Science Foundation's plans to incinerate waste at McMurdo Station in the 
Antarctica, alleging violations of both NEPA and Executive Order 12,114 (the 




'"^ Id at 762. 
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assessment).''^ The district court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction, finding an absence of congressional intent to apply NEPA 
extraterritorially and noting that Executive Order 12,114 does not provide for a 
private cause of action.'''' The court of Appeals reversed, holding that the application 
of NEPA to federal actions is not limited to actions occurring or having effects within 
the United States."'* The court found that the presumption against the extraterritorial 
apphcation of U.S. law does not apply where the "conduct regulated by the 
government occurs within the United States.""^ This focus on the location of the 
decision making process marks a dramatic shift from previous caselaw and raises the 
question whether there are ever extraterritorial issues with NEPA, as decisions will 
generally be made within the United States, even when the impacts are felt outside of 
U.S. territory. Finding that NEPA is designed to "control the decision making 
process.. .not the substance of agency decisions", and that "the decision making 
processes of federal agencies take place almost exclusively in this country" the court 
refused to apply the presumption against extraterritorial application to NEPA. 
Next the court looked for any foreign policy impUcations that might result from the 
application of NEPA in this case and found that Antartica's "sovereignless" status did 
117 
not "present the challenges inherent in the relations between sovereign nations." 
The court was also swayed by the legislative control exercised over McMurdo station, 
"^ Environmental Defense Fund v. Massey, 772 F.Supp. 1296-97 (D.D.C. 1991) rev'd 986 F.2d 528 
(D.C. Or. 1993). 
'"Mat 1298. 
'"Massey, 986 F.2dat 532. 
"'Mat 531. 
"*M. at532. 
'"M. at 534. 
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and travel to and from Antartica, by the United States."^ In ultimately applying 
NEPA's EIS requirement to the National Science Foundation's actions in Antartica, 
the court did, however, note that foreign pohcy considerations may in some cases 
prevent NEPA's application, but failed to elaborate a balancing test."^ 
Just when it seemed that the only restraint on the extraterritorial application of 
NEPA was the presence of foreign policy implications, two United States Supreme 
Court decisions in non-NEPA cases dramatically limited the holding in Massey. hi 
both Smith v. United States^^° and Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, hic.,'^' the highest 
court in the land reaffirmed the vitality of the presumption against the extraterritorial 
application of U.S. law, concluding that "the presumption is rooted in a number of 
considerations, not the least of which is the common sense notion that Congress 
generally legislates with domestic concerns in mind,"^^^ and that "the presumption 
has a foundation broader than the desire to avoid conflict with the laws of other 
nations."'^^ 
NEPA CoaUtion of Japan v. Aspin^^"^ further weakened the "headquarters 
theory" oi Massey and demonstrated the significant weight that foreign policy 
concerns carry when balanced against desirability of extraterritorial application of 
NEPA. In this case, a coalition of Japanese citizens and environmental groups, citing 
the holding in Environmental Defense Fund v. Massey, alleged that the United States 
Navy's failure to prepare an EIS covering its activities and bases in Japan was a 
118 Id. 
'"Mat 537. 
'^^ 507 U.S. 197 (1993). 
'^' 509 U.S. 155 (1993). 
122 Supra note 121 at 206. 
'^' Supra note 122 at 174. 
'^* 837 F. Supp. 466 (D.D.C. 1993). 
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failure to comply with NEPA.'^^ The court, however, rejected that argument, noting 
that the status U.S. military bases in a foreign country were "not analogous to the 
status of American research stations in Antartica."^^^ The court found that the 
plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate that "Congress intended NEPA to apply in 
situations where there is a substantial likelihood that treaty relations will be affected," 
and determined that U.S. foreign policy interests clearly outweighed any benefits of 
applying the EIS requirement.^^' The court limited its holding to instances with 
"clear foreign policy and treaty concerns involving a security relationship between 
the United States and a sovereign power" and left open the question whether NEPA 
might apply when treaty and foreign policy considerations were less apparent. 
VIII. Analysis 
Judge Snyder's holding in NRDC v. the United States Department of the 
Navy demonstrates that the "headquarters theory" ofMassey is still very much aUve 
and well. Referring to Massey, Judge Snyder indicated she found its reasoning 
persuasive, noting that "like the NSF's decision at issue in Massey, planning for the 
LWAD program takes place entirely in the United States and is therefore not subject 
to the presumption against territoriality."'^^ Citing the unique procedural nature of 
NEPA, Judge Snyder indicated that it's substantive effect outside of the United States 
is minimal.^^° She also recognized the potential foreign pohcy exceptions to applying 






Department of the Navy involve global commons (Antarctica and the EEZ) and 
therefore application of NEPA would not "implicate important foreign policy 
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concerns or demonstrate a lack of respect for another nation's sovereignty."     For 
this very reason, both Massey and NRDC v. United States Department of the Navy 
can be distinguished from NEPA Coalition of Japan v. Aspin and NRDC v. NRC.^ 
In response to the Department of the Navy's argument that Executive order 12,114 
provides the exclusive determinations regarding the fiirtherance of the purpose of 
NEPA outside of the United States, the court relied on Stone's holding that Executive 
Order 12,114 did not preempt the appUcation of NEPA to all federal actions outside 
of the United States.'" Finally, regarding the plain language of NEPA and its 
legislative history. Judge Snyder agreed with the court's conclusion in Saipan ex rel. 
Guerrero v. United States that both the language and legislative history of NEPA 
indicate congressional intent to apply the statute to all areas under United States 
control, and concluded that, because the United States exercises substantial legislative 
control over the EEZ, NEPA should apply to federal actions which may affect the 
environment in the EEZ. 
Judge Snyder's ruling will not only impact future LWAD tests, but may also 
affect a host of other activities, including fisheries management, offshore oil and gas 
leasing, ocean dumping and pipehne construction. While arguably dicta because the 
holding was not necessary to the ultimate result (the dismissal of the plaintiffs 
programmatic challenge), even if controlling, the ruling's precedence is limited to the 
^^^ Supra note 1 at 17. 
''"Id. 
'^' Id. at 18-19. 
'''Id 
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Central District of California. Nonetheless, this ruling provides environmental groups 
v^ith a case to hang their hat on when raising the extraterritorial appUcation issue in 
any U.S. court and will no doubt be cited in future cases. While federal agencies may 
not choose to accept this ruhng and apply NEPA to their activities in the EEZ, at a 
minimum they will certainly beef up the environmental assessments they do under 
Executive Order 12,114 in anticipation of litigation. 
IX. Recommendations 
The broad, sweeping language of NEPA fails to clearly state the intent of 
Congress concerning the extraterritorial application NEPA. Unfortunately, extensive 
litigation has done httle to clarify the ambiguity regarding the reach of NEPA. While 
Executive Order 12114 attempts to fill the gaps in NEPA, it falls far short of 
providing adequate enviroimiental protection due to its numerous exemptions and 
lack of an enforcement mechanism. Although NRDC v. United States Department of 
the Navy appears to breathe new life into the Massey "headquarters theory" it is very 
limited in its holding and precedential value. A Congressional amendment bringing 
clarity and consistency to the application of NEPA is long overdue. This amendment 
should reflect the transboundary nature of environmental issues and recognize that we 
owe the global environment the same standard of care that we exercise within the 
United States. The United States has demonstrated little reluctance in assuming the 
role of world leader in other areas, it is now time to assume that role regarding the 
protection of the environment. NEPA should be amended to make its international 
'^^ Wat 21. 
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application explicit, with exemptions limited to cases that demonstrate a severe 
impact on national security or undermine United States diplomatic initiatives. The 
national security and foreign poUcy exemptions should be allowed only after 
Presidential review and a demonstration of a compelling conflict with national 
security or foreign policy. 
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